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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 940716-CA 
v. : Priority No. 2 
STACEY A. COVINGTON, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for possession of a 
controlled substance (methamphetamine) in a drug free zone, a 
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-
8(2)(a)(i) & 8(5)(a)(ix) (1994), and possession of a controlled 
substance (marijuana), a class A misdemeanor, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court in and for Juab County, State of Utah, the 
Honorable Lynn W. Davis, presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
to hear the case pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) 
(1994). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The following issues are presented on appeal: 
1. Was defendant "present" at an apartment for which a 
search warrant had been issued when he was standing just outside 
the only door to the apartment and was known to associate with 
one of the apartment's occupants, a suspected drug trafficker? 
The trial court's finding that defendant was at the 
apartment to be searched when police arrived to execute a search 
warrant is a finding of fact. See generally. State v. Pena, 869 
P.2d 932, 935 (Utah 1994) ("Factual questions are generally 
regarded as entailing the empirical, such as things, events, 
actions, or conditions happening, existing, or taking place, as 
well as the subjective, such state of mind.") (citation omitted). 
A finding of fact will not be reversed unless clearly erroneous. 
Id. 
2. Assuming defendant was on the premises of the 
apartment when the search warrant was executed, were police 
justified in searching his person where they had already 
discovered defendant was in possession of drug paraphernalia 
during a protective pat-down search of his outer clothing? 
The question of whether defendant was within the scope 
of the warrant is most appropriately treated as a question of 
"fact-to-law" that is reviewed for correctness. Pena, 932 P.2d 
at 936. However, given the factually sensitive nature of this 
issue, the trial court should be extended "a measure of 
discretion" instead of having its ruling subjected to "close, de 
novo review." Id. at 939-40. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
U.S. Const. Amend. IV: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
2 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with possession of a controlled 
substance (methamphetamine) in a drug free zone, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv) & 
8(5) (ix) (1994), possession of a controlled substance (marijuana) 
in drug free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) (1994), possession of a controlled 
substance without affixing the appropriate drug tax stamp, a 
third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 59-19-
103(1) (b) (1992), and possession of drug paraphernalia in a drug 
free zone, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37a-5(l) (1994) (R. 13-14). 
Prior to trial, defendant moved to suppress evidence 
that was seized from his person (R. 28). After an evidentiary 
hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact, conclusions of 
law and an order denying defendant's motion to suppress (R. 139-
47). (A copy of the trial court's ruling is attached hereto as 
addendum A.) Defendant then entered a negotiated plea agreement 
in which he pled guilty to the first two counts in the 
information in return for a dismissal of the second two counts as 
well as other considerations specified in the plea agreement (R. 
158-164). 
The trial court accepted the plea agreement and 
sentenced defendant to concurrent terms of one to fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison on the first count and one year in the 
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Utah County Jail on the second count (R. 174-76). The court 
suspended execution of the sentence and placed defendant on 
probation for 36 months (R. 175). Defendant appeals from that 
judgment and challenges the trial court's denial of his motion to 
suppress.1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to 
suppress evidence, Utah appellate courts recite the facts in the 
light most favorable to the trial court's findings and order. 
State v. Delanev, 869 P.2d 4, 5 (Utah App. 1994). So viewed, the 
facts are as follow. 
On February 22, 1994, Rachel Anderson was arrested 
based on an outstanding warrant. In a search incident to her 
arrest, police officers found two small bags of methamphetamine 
concealed in her clothing. Anderson told police that she had 
stolen the drugs several hours earlier from a person named Rick 
Close, with whom she had been smoking methamphetamine on the day 
of her arrest. According to Anderson, Close had supplied her 
with methamphetamine in the past and had more methamphetamine 
packaged in small bindles and ready for sale at his apartment. 
She also said that Close was living with Melissa Seamster and 
1
 Although the record on appeal indicates that defendant 
waived his right to appeal when he entered his guilty plea, the 
plea was in fact conditioned upon his right to challenge the 
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress. That fact was 
made clear at the guilty plea hearing, but it was inadvertantly 
omitted from the plea agreement, and hence the trial court's 
judgment. Rather than incurring the expense of transcribing the 
plea colloquy, the parties intend to supplement the record with a 
stipulation to the facts recited above. 
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John Walker in the basement apartment of a white frame house 
located at 479 South 100 East (R. 147, 152A-153). 
Police were familiar with Close because they had 
received "tips" from at least three sources that Close had been 
selling methamphetamine within the previous three weeks and 
because they had discovered drug paraphernalia in a recent search 
of his vehicle (R. 152A). Officers also knew that Close was 
wanted on two active arrest warrants and that Seamster and Walker 
were also wanted for outstanding warrants (id.). According to 
Anderson, both Close and Walker were afraid to leave the 
apartment for fear of being arrested (R. 152-152A). Police were 
nevertheless able to confirm through surveillance that Close was 
in the apartment described by Anderson (R. 192, 206). 
Based primarily on the above information, police sought 
a search warrant for the basement apartment of the house located 
at 479 South 100 East in Pleasant Grove, Utah (R. 147, 149-
153).2 (A copy of the search warrant and supporting affidavit 
2
 As it turns out, the building in which Close had taken an 
apartment was white on three sides but blue on the side facing 
the street, and the exact street address for Close's apartment 
was actually 475 South, not 479 South. However, there were only 
two apartments in the building, one on the main level and Close's 
basement apartment- More importantly, the only entrance to 
Close's basement apartment was at the rear of the building, which 
was painted white and carried no street address numbers. Members 
of the narcotics task force were familiar with the building and 
the location of Close's basement apartment because they had 
watched it from the back window of their nearby offices. Over 
the past year, they had received numerous tips about narcotics 
activity in the building and had recently arrested others in the 
building on drug related offenses (R. 146-47, 152, 188-89). 
Defendant argued below that the errors in the warrant 
rendered it invalid. The trial court rejected that claim on the 
(continued...) 
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appears at pages 14 9-153 of the record. A copy of it also is 
attached hereto as addendum B.) Because it was already dark by 
the time police had completed their affidavit and warrant 
request, and because they knew Close was smoking methamphetamine 
earlier in the day and had more methamphetamine packaged for 
sale, the officers requested nighttime service authorization so 
that they could conduct an immediate search (R. 152). Given the 
potential for violence under the facts presented and the concern 
that the small bindles of methamphetamine would be destroyed or 
concealed if they gave notice of their intent to search the 
apartment, the officers also requested permission to execute the 
warrant on a no-knock basis (id.). The requested search warrant 
was issued (R. 147, 149-50). 
One of the officers that participated in the 
investigation of Close and execution of the search warrant was 
Deputy Utah County Sheriff Sean Adamson, a four year veteran of 
the local narcotics task force with twelve years of experience as 
a police officer (R. 187, 197). According to Adamson, police 
were familiar not only with Close, but with defendant as well (R. 
190-92) . Specifically, although he had not seen defendant at 
2(...continued) 
ground that police were personally familiar with the residence 
because of their ongoing surveillance efforts. Indeed, the 
officers did not rely on address numbers to determine the 
apartment to be searched because none appeared on the building 
near the apartment. The rest of the description was accurate, 
and no officer went to the wrong address. The trial court 
therefore concluded that there was no confusion about what 
apartment was to be searched and held that the errors were of no 
legal consequence (R. 144). Defendant has elected not to 
challenge that determination on appeal. 
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Close's apartment, defendant frequented a house in American Fork 
that was under surveillance for suspected narcotics distribution 
(R. 191). Close likewise frequented the American Fork residence 
(R. 191), and, as the trial court found, associated with 
defendant (R. 146). 
During a pre-search planning session, officers that had 
been watching Close's apartment while the warrant was being 
prepared reported that defendant was at Close's apartment (R. 
191-92) . Officers reviewed the physical layout of the building 
and charted a plan for executing the search warrant. Two 
uniformed officers were assigned to make the initial entry and 
would be followed by the other officers, including Adamson (R. 
191-94). 
When the officers arrived at Close's apartment to 
execute the warrant at approximately 8:40 p.m. on February 22, 
1994, it was dark outside and there was snow on the ground (R. 
146, 209-215). The entry to Close's apartment was essentially 
"surrounded" by vehicles and debris (R. 192). A truck with its 
hood up was parked within eight to ten feet of the door leading 
to Close's apartment (R. 913). There was another vehicle 
directly north of the truck, and a third one facing northeast 
that was parked behind the truck (R. 211). A pile of debris to 
the south of the doorway made movement in that area difficult (R. 
192-93) . In fact, the officers were unable to go from the south 
corner of the building to the door of the apartment because of 
the debris (R. 194). They therefore approached from the 
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northside of the doorway where the eight to ten feet between it 
and the truck was clear (R. 210-11). 
The entry team encountered defendant at the door 
leading down the stairs to Close's basement apartment (R. 146, 
194, 205-06). Although the officers had been told that defendant 
was at the apartment, they did not know he was outside until they 
encountered him just outside the door (R. 206). Defendant 
appeared startled (R. 209), and, rather than have the entry team 
further delay their entry, Adamson took custody of defendant and 
directed the entry team down the stairs to Close's apartment (R. 
194-95, 205-06). 
Concerned for his safety as well as that of the entry 
team, Adamson ordered defendant to lay on the ground by the truck 
and conducted a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of defendant for 
weapons (R. 146, 195-96, 204). In so doing, he felt a hard, 
cylindrical shaped object about the size of his "pinky" finger in 
defendant's front shirt pocket (R. 196-98, 208). From his 
experience as a narcotics officer, Adamson recognized the object 
in defendant's pocket as a marijuana pipe.3 Adamson, also felt 
3
 Adamson indicated that there are different types of 
marijuana pipes ranging from "bongs that are huge to small 
marijuana pipes" (R. 198). According to Adamson, the "bowl 
size[] is the key" to knowing whether a pipe is used for tobacco 
or marijuana (R. 198). Specifically, tobacco pipes have a large 
bowl at the end of a stem, which enables the person to smoke 
without continually refilling the pipe. In contrast, marijuana 
pipes have only a small bowl because marijuana is smoked in small 
amounts at a time called "hits" (R. 198). The object Adamson 
felt in defendant's pocket was consistent with a type of 
marijuana pipe that is generally made out of "small brass 
fittings that can be purchased out of what [are] call[ed] head-
shops" (R. 196-98). 
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what he believed to be a cigarette package in defendant's pocket 
R. 197). 
Adamson did not immediately remove either object from 
defendant's shirt. Instead, he waited until the apartment had 
been secured and took defendant inside the apartment where he put 
him with the other suspects (Close, Seamster and Walker) so that 
it woiuld be easier and safer for the officers to watch all of 
the suspects (R. 198-99, 205, 213). Adamson then removed the 
marijuana pipe and cigarette package from defendant's pocket; an 
examination of the package revealed that it contained marijuana. 
Defendant was then arrested for possession of drug paraphernalia 
and possession of marijuana (R. 199, 217). 
After defendant had been taken inside the apartment, 
another officer went back up the stairs to where defendant had 
been observed and found a bottle of methamphetamine on the ground 
in front of the truck (R. 145, 216-17). The officer saw a second 
container in the engine compartment of the truck, which appeared 
to have been thrown or tossed there. Inside the container was a 
white powder that, although not a controlled substance, the 
officers believed was intended to be mixed with the 
methamphetamine prior to its sale (R. 145). Finally, in the 
process of booking defendant into jail, another small quantity of 
methamphetamine was found in the change pocket of defendant's 
Levi jeans (R. 145, 217). 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly determined that defendant was 
"present" at Close's apartment when police arrived to execute the 
warrant. His presence at the apartment, association with Close, 
and appearance at another house at which drug trafficking was 
suspected combined with the fact he was in possession of drug 
paraphernalia was sufficient to bring defendant within the scope 
of the search warrant. The search of defendant's person after he 
was returned to Close's apartment was therefore proper, and the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress should be 
upheld. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the proceedings below, the trial court limited its 
analysis to those issues that were in dispute. On appeal, 
defendant challenges only the trial court's finding that he was 
"present" at Close's apartment at the time of the search and its 
consequent conclusion that defendant was within the scope of the 
search warrant. In so doing, defendant has the burden of 
demonstrating two distinct points of error. First, defendant 
must demonstrate that the trial court's finding that defendant 
was present at Close's apartment at the time police arrived is 
clearly erroneous. Second, assuming defendant was present at the 
apartment, defendant must demonstrate that the trial court erred 
in concluding that he was within the scope of the search warrant. 
If defendant prevails on the first point, then he automatically 
prevails on the second point. However, assuming defendant was 
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present, the question of whether he was within the scope of the 
warrant requires additional analysis. Defendant's claims are 
addressed below in seriatim, 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAS "PRESENT" AT CLOSE'S APARTMENT 
WHEN POLICE ARRIVED TO EXECUTE THEIR WARRANT 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the trial 
court's finding that he was present at Close's apartment when 
police arrived to execute the search warrant is clearly 
erroneous. See generally, Pena, 869 P.2d at 35 (factual 
questions are those issues that are based on empirical evidence). 
In order to make such a showing, it is defendant's burden to 
"marshal the evidence in support of the [trial court's] findings 
and then demonstrate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support as to be against the 
clear weight of the evidence, thus making them clearly 
erroneous." State v. A House and 1.37 Acres, 253 Utah Adv. Rep. 
30, 33 n.4 (Utah 1994) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted). Absent such an effort, Utah appellate courts "assume[] 
that the record supports the findings of the trial court and 
proceed[] to a review of the accuracy of the lower court's 
conclusions of law and the application of that law in the case." 
Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
Defendant has not taken up this burden. Based on that 
failure alone, this Court may assume that the trial court's 
finding that defendant was present at Close's apartment is 
11 
supported by the record evidence and proceed to the question of 
whether defendant was within the scope of the warrant. In any 
event, there was ample evidence to support the trial court's 
finding. 
A. Defendant's Presence at the Only Door to 
Close's Apartment and His Known 
Association With Close Supports the 
Trial Court's Determination that 
Defendant Was Present At Close's 
Apartment When the Search Warrant Was 
Executed. 
The trial court properly rejected defendant's claim 
that because he was standing outside of Close's apartment, as 
opposed to inside the apartment, he was not "present" at the 
apartment when police arrived to execute the search warrant (R. 
143). In so doing, the trial court recognized that the question 
was not as simple as whether defendant was inside or outside of 
the apartment. Rather, resolution of that question required 
consideration of whether the facts indicated that defendant was 
at the location to be searched. 
When first encountered by police, defendant was 
standing at the only door to Close's apartment, which is the only 
door leading inside the house on that side of the building. See 
Exhibit 3.4 Moreover, as the trial court found, defendant was 
4
 Exhibit 3 is a photograph submitted by defendant that 
shows the rear of the building where Close's basement apartment 
was located (R. 207). However, police did not enter the rear 
door that is visible in Exhibit 3 because it did not lead to 
Close's apartment. Though not visible in Exhibit 3, the door to 
Close's was around the corner and to the north of the door to the 
covered porch appearing in Exhibit 3. Police passed through the 
porch and descended the steps to Close's apartment (R. 210, 215). 
(continued...) 
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"'walled in' by trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the 
truck with the raised hood to the east, and the apartment to the 
west" (R. 142). Also, as Adamson explained, the area immediately 
south of the door to Close's apartment was impassable because 
there was a pile of debris between the door and the driveway. 
Under the circumstances, the only reason anybody would have been 
standing where defendant was located would be to enter or exit 
Close's apartment. Given these facts alone, it cannot be said 
that the trial court's finding that defendant was present at 
Close's apartment is clearly erroneous. 
In this case, however, additional evidence supports the 
trial court's finding. Specifically, defendant was known to 
associate with Close. Defendant and Close also frequented 
another house that was under police surveillance for drug 
trafficking. Given Close's history of drug activity and the fact 
4(...continued) 
The other house in Exhibit 3 is directly south of 
Close's apartment. It is that building with which defendant 
claimed Close's apartment shared a common area, including the 
spot at which defendant was standing when police arrived. The 
trial court rejected that claim because, as the photograph shows, 
the spot where defendant was standing (the "x" denoted "SC" on 
Exhibit 3) was plainly associated with Close's apartment and not 
the house to the south (R. 142, 212-13). 
The other object that was drawn on the photograph 
indicates where the truck with the raised hood was parked at the 
time of the search (R. 213). Also, as Adamson explained, the 
debris that was to the south of Close's door had been removed by 
the time Exhibit 3 was created. In contrast, the place where the 
truck and other vehicles were parked at the time of the search 
appears to be cluttered with debris that was not present when the 
warrant was executed (R. 209-11). Finally, while Exhibit 3 was 
apparently taken some months after the search was conducted and 
during the daytime, at the time police executed the search 
warrant it was dark and the ground was covered with snow (R. 209, 
215) . 
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that officers knew Close had additional methamphetamine for sale 
in his apartment, coupled with defendant's own suspected 
involvement in drug activity, it was reasonable to infer that 
defendant was visiting Close. That is particularly true because 
no other apparent reason exists for defendant's presence at the 
door to Close's apartment. Under the unique facts of this case, 
the trial court properly determined that defendant was present at 
the place to be searched at the time of the search. 
That determination is critical because the United 
States Supreme Court has held that "a warrant to search for 
contraband founded on probable cause implicitly carries with it 
the limited authority to detain the occupants of the premises 
while a proper search is conducted." Michigan v. Summers, 452 
U.S. 692, 705, 101 S.Ct. 2587, 2595 (1981) (footnote omitted). 
Accord State v. Banks, 720 P.2d 1380, 1383 (Utah 1986) (approving 
suspect's restraint by handcuffing during execution of search 
warrant "to prevent [suspect] from secreting contraband and to 
preserve premises during the search"). 
Under Summers and its progeny, the brief detention of 
defendant just outside Close's apartment was clearly proper. 
Also, as the State argued below, concern for officer safety 
justified Adamson's brief pat-down search of defendant under 
Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1883 (1968) (R. 
58-9).5 Defendant implicitly recognized as much because he did 
5
 The entry team hesitated briefly when they unexpectedly 
encountered defendant at Close's door, and Adamson was concerned 
(continued...) 
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not contest the State's claim that the brief pat-down search of 
his person was supported by a concern for officer safety. Nor 
does defendant take issue with it on appeal. See State v. 
Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) (holding that "where a 
defendant fails to assert a particular ground for suppressing 
[allegedly] unlawfully obtained evidence in the trial court, an 
appellate court will not consider that ground on appeal"). 
Defendant instead argued only that he was not present 
at Close's apartment and therefore should not have been subjected 
to any search whatsoever. For the reasons stated above, the 
trial court properly rejected that claim. 
The question remains, however, whether the additional 
search of defendant after he was returned to Close's apartment 
(the search in which Adamson removed the marijuana pipe and 
cigarette package from defendant's shirt pocket) was justified. 
As demonstrated below, that search was proper because Adamson 
5(...continued) 
that defendant might warn Close and the others in the apartment 
of the impending police entry. As an experienced narcotics 
officer, Adamson no doubt realized that the drug industry is one 
that is "rife with deadly weapons." United States v. Truiillo. 
809 F.2d 108, 113 (1st Cir.), cert.denied, 482 U.S. 916, 107 
S.Ct. 3191 (1987) (cited approvingly by this Court in State v. 
Leonard, 825 P.2d 664, 670 (Utah App. 1991)). See also United 
States y. Post, 607 F.2d 847, 861 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[i]t is not 
unreasonable to assume that a dealer of narcotics might be 
armed"). Indeed, the officers emphasized that concern in their 
search warrant affidavit (R. 152). The three known occupants of 
the apartment were all wanted on outstanding arrest warrants. It 
was also dark outside, and defendant appeared "startled" upon 
seeing the police (R. 209). As the Court recognized in Summers, 
the execution of a search warrant under such circumstances may 
give rise to "sudden violence" and officers must "routinely 
exercise unquestioned command of the situation." Summers, 452 
U.S. at 7602, 101 S.Ct. at 2594. 
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knew defendant had a marijuana pipe in his pocket. That fact 
brought defendant within the scope of the warrant. 
B. The Discovery of Drug Paraphernalia in 
Defendant's Shirt Pocket During a Terry 
Frisk Gave Rise to Probable Cause to 
Believe Defendant Was Engaged in Illegal 
Narcotics Use. Combined with His 
Presence at Close's Apartment, That Fact 
Brought Defendant Within the Scope of 
the Search Warrant. 
When Adamson conducted a Terry search of defendant, he 
felt a marijuana pipe in defendant's shirt pocket. In Minnesota 
v. Dickerson, U.S. , 113 S. Ct. 2130, 2137 (1993), the 
Supreme Court held that if "a police officer lawfully pats down a 
suspect's outer clothing and feels an object whose contour and 
mass makes its identity immediately apparent, there has been no 
invasion of the suspect's privacy beyond that already authorized 
by the officer's search for weapons" under Terry. In this case, 
it is undisputed that Adamson detected what he immediately 
recognized to be an illegal marijuana pipe in defendant's shirt 
pocket in the course of a proper Terry search. 
Adamson's discovery of the marijuana pipe in 
defendant's pocket served to bring defendant within the scope of 
the search warrant. That fact, combined with police knowledge of 
defendant's frequent visits to another suspected drug house in 
American Fork, his association with Close (a known drug user and 
drug dealer) and his presence at Close's apartment where probable 
cause existed to believe narcotics use and distribution was 
ongoing gave rise to the individualized suspicion necessary to 
distinguish this case from Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 90, 100 
16 
S.Ct. 338 (1979). Ybarra condemns the practice of searching 
those present when a search warrant is executed based solely on 
their presence at the area to be searched. Plainly, defendant 
was not merely present at the place to be searched. Police had 
an independent basis to suspect defendant was involved in 
narcotics use based on his possession of drug paraphernalia. 
Defendant was therefore within the scope of the search warrant, 
and his reliance on Ybarra is misplaced. 
Even if defendant's possession of the marijuana pipe 
was insufficient to bring defendant within the scope of the 
warrant, it provided probable cause to arrest him for possession 
of drug paraphernalia. Defendant was therefore subject to a 
search incident to his arrest. See State v. Ayala, 762 P.2d 
1107, 1112 (Utah App. 1988) (where police have probable cause to 
arrest a suspect, they may contemporaneously search the suspect 
incident to that arrest). Accordingly, even assuming the trial 
court erred in holding the search of defendant's person was 
within the scope of the search warrant, its denial of defendant's 
motion may be affirmed on the ground that the search was a proper 
search incident to defendant's arrest for possession of drug 
paraphernalia. See State v. Elder, 815 P.2d 1341, 1344 n.4 (Utah 
App. 1991); State v. Droneburcr. 781 P.2d 1303, 1305 (Utah App. 
1989) (a trial court's judgment may be affirmed on any proper 
ground apparent from the record even if the trial court assigned 
another reason for its holding). 
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STATEMENT REGARDING NEED FOR ORAL ARGUMENT AND 
DESIRABILITY OF A PUBLISHED OPINION 
The facts of this case are essentially undisputed and 
the legal issues presented on appeal have been narrowly defined. 
It therefore seems unlikely that oral argument will be of much 
assistance to this Court, 
None of the issues raised by defendant are matters of 
first impression. On the contrary, no matter how this case is 
resolved, it appears that no new legal ground will be broken by 
the Court's opinion. Accordingly, it does not appear that 
disposition of this case by published opinion is warranted. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should uphold the 
trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress and affirm 
defendant's convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this c/ffi^day of April, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
&cs/. 
TODD A. UTZING! 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
Addendum A 
Trial Court's Ruling on 
Defendant's Motion to Suppress 
FILED 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURTLY/™ Judicial District Court 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH g ^ M f H W k 
0\K ) Deputy 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S 7 / ( ^ 9 ^ 
MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE 
CASE NO. 941400228 
DATE: July 18, 1994 
JUDGE: LYNN W.DAVIS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
STACEY COVINGTON, 
Defendant 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence, filed 
May 4, 1994. A hearing on this motion was held June 22, 1994. The Court, after carefully 
considering the memoranda of counsel, entertaining argument of counsel, and having been 
advised of the facts and law pertaining to this case, now enters the following: 
I. 
FACTS 
On February 22, 1994, officers of the Pleasant Grove police department arrested 
Rachel Anderson pursuant to warrant. When officers discovered methamphetamine on her 
person, Anderson said that she had stolen the drug from one Rick Close and that there was 
more of the drug at Mr. Close's residence. Officers knew of Mr. Close, having investigated 
and arrested him a number of times in the recent past. Moreover, Mr. Close's basement 
apartment was near the offices occupied at that time by the Narcotics Task Force (NET). 
Indeed, officers had observed the entrance to Mr. Close's apartment from their office window. 
Based upon Anderson's information, along with other information including their 
personal knowledge of Close, officers obtained a search warrant from the Honorable John C. 
Backlund of the Fourth Circuit Court. The warrant authorized "search of. . . [t]he downstairs 
apartment and the persons of all individuals present at 479 South 100 Eas t . . . for the 
presence of Rick Close, John Walker and Melissa Seamster" (Co-defendants in this case) and 
drug-related evidence. Moreover, the warrant describes the building as "a white frame 
building containing two apartments." The description of the apartment was based upon the 
officers1 personal acquaintance with the premises. However, the correct address of the 
building is 475. South 100 East and the building is white on three sides but blue on the side 
facing the street. 
At the time this search warrant was issued, there were active warrants for the arrest of 
the three named individuals. As stated in the supporting affidavit, officers believed that all 
three were then living in the apartment—a fact later confirmed during the execution of the 
warrant. Moreover, to prevent the destruction, loss or sale of the drug-related evidence 
believed to be in Close's apartment, officers applied for and obtained authorization for 
nighttime, no-knock entry, pursuant to U.C.A. 77-23-5(1). 
Pleasant Grove uniformed officers and NET officers executed the warrant at 8:40 p.m. 
on February 22, 1994. As they approached the only entrance to the apartment, on the east 
side of the building, officers observed Defendant Stacey Covington standing just outside the 
apartment door. Near the Defendant to the east was the front end of a pickup truck with its 
hood raised. NET officers recognized Defendant as a person associated with Rick Close and 
the others named in the warrant. Some of the officers approached the Defendant, restrained 
him, and conducted a frisk or "pat down9* search of his person. This pat down search resulted 
in the discovery of both a marijuana pipe and marijuana. 
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Following this discovery, officers brought Defendant into the apartment and secured 
him along with the other Co-defendants, while they awaited transportation to the Pleasant 
Grove Police Department. Officers then found a small canister on the ground near the spot 
where the Defendant had been restrained. The canister proved to contain 7.3 grams of 
methamphetamine, a controlled substance. Officers also found a second container in the 
engine compartment of the truck, which appeared to have been thrown or tossed there. 
Within the container was a white powder non-controlled substance which officers believe to 
have been intended for mixture with the methamphetamine prior to sale. 
As with all arrestees, Defendant was searched again at the police department, at which 
time they found a small quantity of methamphetamine on the Defendant's person. Defendant 
was subsequently charged with Possession of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute 
in a Drug Free Zone (a First Degree Felony), Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance in 
a Drug Free Zone (a Class A Misdemeanor), Illegal Drug Tax (a Third Degree Felony), and 
(Unlawful Possession or Use of Drug Paraphernalia in a Drug Free Zone (a Class A 
Misdemeanor). 
n. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
A. Whether certain errors in the address and description of the premises to be searched 
render warrant defective when officers were neither mistaken nor confused as to the 
location described. 
B. Whether Defendant, who was searched while standing just outside the only door to 
apartment, fell within the scope of warrant authorizing search of "apartment and the 
person of all individuals present." 
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C. Whether affidavit and request for search warrant gave reasonable cause to support 
issuance of warrant authorizing nighttime search under U.C.A. 77-23-5(1). 
m. 
ANALYSIS 
A. Description of the Premises 
The Defendant seeks to invalidate the search warrant based on inaccuracies in its 
identification and description of the targeted premises. The Court considers this an impotent 
ploy on the facts of this case. It is well-established that the purpose of the description of the 
premises is to enable the officers executing the warrant to locate the premises. Thus "[t]he 
description is sufficient if the officer executing the search warrant can with reasonable effort 
ascertain and identify the place to be searched." State v. Mclntire. 768 P.2d 970 at 972 (Utah 
App. 1989) citing State v. Anderson. 701 P.2d 1099 at 1102-03 (Utah, 1985). 
In this case, NET officers were personally familiar with the residence, having observed 
Close, one of its residents, for some time. Moreover, affiant Officer Michael Blackhurst, and 
other NET officers were all present and participated in the execution of the warrant. None of 
the officers went to a wrong location. Neither did the officers rely upon address numbers to 
determine the correct house: the numbers did not appear anywhere on the building. 
Defendant does not dispute that the accurate parts of the description, coupled with the 
officers' actual acquaintance with the premises, neither left confusion as to the location of the 
premises nor resulted in a search of the wrong premises. The three persons named in the 
warrant were all in the apartment and were all arrested pursuant to warrant. The errors in 
description of the premises amount to nothing of legal consequence. 
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B. Scope of the Warrant 
The warrant in this case authorized the search of the "apartment and the person of all 
individuals present." Defendant argues that because he was standing outside, he was not 
"present" at the apartment at the time he was spotted and searched. However, "it has been 
generally held that a search warrant describing only the residence will authorize a search of 
any buildings or vehicles within the •curtilage1 even though they are not specifically described 
in the warrant," State v. Basturo. 807 P.2d 162 (Kan. App. 1991, afTd. 821 P. 2d 327 (Kan. 
1991), see also United States v. Gottschalk. 915 F.2d 1459 (10th Cir., 1990) (authorized 
search of premises included search of car inside curtilage). Accordingly, the issue here is 
whether, at the time of search, Defendant was within the curtilage of the premises. 
The curtilage of a home is "usually defined as a small piece of land, not necessarily 
enclosed, around a dwelling house and generally includes buildings used for domestic 
purposes in the conduct of family affairs." (State v. Render. 588 P.2d 447 at 449 (Haw. 
1979) (emphasis added)). A number of factors, as enumerated by the United States Supreme 
Court, should be considered in reaching a determination of the extent of the curtilage in any 
given case. These factors include (1) the proximity of the area to the home; (2) whether the 
area has been fenced or enclosed; (3) the nature and uses of the area; and (4) what steps have 
been taken to protect the area from observation. United States v. Dunn. 480 U.S. 294 (1977). 
In this case, Defendant was located at the time of search immediately east of the only 
entrance to the basement apartment. He was standing within ten feet of the house, between 
the apartment door and a nearby truck with its hood raised. Both the Defendant and the truck 
were well within a space that had the obvious appearance of a parking and yard area for 
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residents of the apartment. The area is bounded by trees and debris to the north and a dirt 
driveway to the south. 
Defendant would characterize the area to the east of the house as a common area for 
both the house mentioned in the warrant and the house immediately to the south. It is true 
that the driveway flows into a large dirt parking area that is shared by Mr. Close's apartment 
and the building or buildings to the south. (At the time of the arrest-February-the dirt was 
snow-packed.) However, the spot where the Defendant was first discovered and searched was 
so close to the back of the house and far enough away from the line of the driveway as to 
leave no room for doubt that he was associated with the house. In effect, the Defendant was 
"walled in" by the trees to the north, a driveway to the south, the truck with the raised hood 
to the east, and the apartment to the west. This small area, adjacent to the apartment, clearly 
fell within the curtilage. 
The scope of the warrant authorized a search for drugs which might be found on the 
person of anyone present, including the Defendant. Given Defendant's known association 
with persons who lived at the residence, coupled with his proximity to the apartment door, he 
was "present" at the apartment and consequently within the scope of the warrant. 
C. Nighttime Search 
Defendant relies on State v. Rowe (no citation given) to sustain the proposition that 
the supporting affidavit here did not furnish "reasonable cause" for authorizing a nighttime 
search. In Rowe, the court focused on U.C.A. 77-23-5(1), which states in pertinent part: 
The magistrate must insert a direction in the warrant that it be served in the 
daytime, unless the affidavits or oral testimony state a reasonable cause to 
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believe a search is necessary in the night to seize the property prior to it being 
concealed, destroyed, damaged or altered, or for other good reason; in which 
case he may insert a direction that it be served any time of the day or night. 
There are two reported decisions in the Rowe case. In State v. Rowe. 806 P.2d 730 
(Utah App. 1991) (Rowe I herein), the Court of Appeals held invalid a nighttime search 
warrant supported by an affidavit containing only the pre-printed statutory language quoted 
above. The warrant was devoid of elaboration of any reasonable basis for its conclusion. In 
State v. Rowe. 850 P.2d 427 (Utah, 1992) (Rowe II herein), the Supreme Court reversed the 
Court of Appeals. Rowe II did not disturb the decision that the bare conclusion in the 
affidavit, without elaboration or basis, could not support a nighttime search. It did, however, 
rule that nighttime search under such a warrant was not a fundamental violation of the 
Defendant's rights which would require suppression of the evidence. The Court observed: 
Where the alleged violation . . . is not 'fundamental* suppression [sic] is 
required only where (1) there was 'prejudice' in the sense that the search might 
not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive if the [r]ule had been 
followed, or (2) there is evidence of intentional and deliberate disregard of a 
provision of the [r]ule. . . . It is only where the violation also implicates 
fundamental, constitutional concerns, is conducted in bad faith or has 
substantially prejudiced the defendant that exclusion may be an appropriate 
remedy, Rowe II at 429. 
The nighttime search warrant in the instant case is clearly appropriate under Rowe I. 
In any event, no allegation has been made which would justify the exclusion of any evidence 
under Rowe H After establishing throughout his supporting affidavit that persons on the 
premises were likely in possession of and selling controlled substances, Officer Blackhurst, 
stated his experience concerning persons who sell small quantities of methamphetamine. 
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"Such persons will typically sell what they have as quickly as they can until they are out of 
inventory . . .". (Paragraph 13.) Officer Blackhurst had previously qualified himself in the 
affidavit as an expert on narcotics trafficking in the area. (Paragraph 1.) Moreover, 
Paragraph 14 establishes that officers had acted in good faith, upon receipt of critical evidence 
mentioned in the affidavit, to prepare and obtain a search warrant but that execution likely 
would be impossible before dark. His conclusion that evidence would be lost or destroyed if 
search were delayed rested upon reliable information indicating that small quantities of 
methamphetamine were being distributed at the apartment, (paragraphs 4, 8, and 12), coupled 
with his experience that small quantities would be sold as quickly as possible. This hardly 
resembles the recitation of statutory factors in a check-off form of the type proscribed by 
Rowe I. 
But in any event, there is no evidence, indeed no allegation, that but for the nighttime 
authorization this search would not have occurred or would not have been so abrasive. There 
is no evidence of an intentional and deliberate disregard of the statute. On the contrary, there 
is evidence of a good faith attempt to balance the statutory concern for nighttime searches 
with the need promptly to obtain the suspected contraband and arrest the individuals known to 
be in the apartment. Hence, there is no basis for the application of Rowe II to the instant 
case. There is, in sum, no reason to suppress the evidence. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The search of the Defendant pursuant to a warrant which misstated the address of the 
premises to be searched and inaccurately described it as a white frame house was lawful, 
inasmuch as officers were not misled as to the correct location of the search. Moreover, the 
S 
Defendant's presence within the curtilage of the apartment connected him with the apartment 
so as to be "present" at the apartment and thus within the scope of a warrant authorizing a 
search of the apartment and the person of all individuals present. Finally, the affidavit in 
support of the warrant stated reasonable cause for the execution of a nighttime search and, in 
any event, Defendant's constitutional rights have not been violated as a result of a purportedly 
inadequate affidavit. 
V. RULING 
Defendant's motion to suppress evidence is denied. 
Dated at Provo, Utah, this day of *j dtty . 
BY THE COURT 
mZt 
iddge Lynn W. Davis 
V< 
cc: James R Taylor 
Shelden R. Carter 
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Addendum B 
Search Warrant and 
Supporting Affidavit 
Kay Bryson DISCOVERY SENT T O 
Utah County Attorney D E F E N S E ATTORNEY 
James R. Taylor *3199 
Deputy County Attorney
 fcR 05 IQQA-PD 
100 East Center Suite 2100 r t o iy" r v 
Provo, Utah 84606 MAR J I 1994 - S C 
(601) 370-8026 
IK THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY. AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF A t 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION : AFFIDAVIT AND REOUEST 
: FOR SEARCH WARRANT 
Comes now Mike Blackhuret having been duly evorn who deposes 
and states: 
1. I am a peace officer for the State of Utah employed by 
the Pleasant Grove Police Department. I have been a peace 
officer for in excess of 26 years and am currently assigned as 
Project Director for the Narcotics Task Force (NET). I have 
received training in the investigation of narcotics related 
offenses and have extensive experience in the field having 
executed hundreds of search warrants of locations where narcotics 
vere expected to be sold. I have conducted surveillance and have 
personally reviewed most of the narcotics investigations 
conducted within this county during the past three years. I am 
familiar with the patterns and practices of persons dealing in 
illegal Narcotics in this area. 
2. On the 22nd day of February, 1994 Rachel Anderson D.0.B. 
12-1-70 was arrest pursuant to two separate criminal warrants by 
officers of the Pleasant Drove Police Department. At the time of 
her arrest officers found two small bags (3 grams total) of white 
powdery substance concealed in her clothing. Anderson stated 
that the powder was "crank", a common street term for illegal 
methamphetamine. The packaging of the material was consistent 
with such a statement. I field tested the powder using a Nik 
Reagent system which indicated positive for methamphetamine. 
3. Anderson was arrested at a 7-11 store at Hain and State, 
/Pleasant Grove. At the time of her arrest she stated that she 
had just stolen the methamphetamine from someone at a residence 
across the street. She described a white apartment building 
across the street and said it was in an upstairs apartment. 
4. After her arrest I interviewed Anderson further. She 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
MAR 1 1 1994-5C ffB 2 5 J994-PD 
stated that she had stolen the drugs several hours before 
(approximately 1500 hours, 2/22/94) from Rick Close's tool bow 
and that he had additional quantities of methamphetamine in 
bindles, ready for sale. She stated that Close vas not avare 
that she had taken any as of yet. She stated that Close lives in 
a house at 479 South 100 East in the basement apartment vhich is 
entered In the rear. She stated that Close has been supplying 
her vith amphetamine and that she has been smoking meth vith 
Close today. Anderson stated that Close vas living vith Melissa 
Seamster and John Walker. 
5. Anderson's physical appearance is very consistent vith 
substantial use of methamphetamine. She has open sores on her 
face and head and appears to be extremely thin and emaciated* Her 
eyes vere bloodshot and draining. Training vhich I have received 
has indicated that such symptoms are consistent vith addiction 
and use of methampheteminee. 
6. Anderson has a substantial criminal history Including 
longtime involvement vith controlled substances. Her history 
includes possession of amphetamines, prescription fraud, and 
uttering forged prescriptions. NET officers have purchased drugs 
from Anderson and have arrested Anderson In possession of 
controlled substances on other occasions. 
7. Officers have verified from personal observation that 
Kick Close resides at 479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove. The 
building is a vhite frame building containing two apartments. 
One is on the main or ground level and the other is a basement 
apartment entered from the rear on the east side. 
8. Rick Close has a substantial history of involvement vith 
controlled substances. Officers have received tips from at least 
three separate sources that Close has been selling 
methamphetamine vithin the past three veeks. Officers recently 
searched^ the vehicle of Close and found drug paraphernalia. 
There are presently tvo active varrants for the arrest of Rick 
Close from the Orem Department of the Fourth Circuit Court vith 
bail in the amount of S470 and the Justice Court for Pleasant 
Grove City vith bail in the amount of S2,000, cash only. 
9. Melissa Seamster Is known to be John Walker's vlfe or 
ex-vife. Seamster has a criminal history Involving alcohol 
violations. A non-ball varrant of arrest for Melissa Seamster 
hae been issued by the Fourth Circuit Court and ie currently 
active. 
10. John Walker, D.Q. B. 5*16-72, is the subject of an 
active varrant of arrest Issued by the Justice Court of Pleasant 
brove for the offenses of assault, criminal mischief, illegal 
consumption of alcohol and other misdemeanor offenses. Bail hae 
been set at si,000, cash only. 
11. Anderson stated to me that Walker vas in the apartment 
and had been for come time. She elated that he will not come out 
because he is afraid of being arrested. 
12. HET officers have b^en receiving tips regarding this 
residence from numerous sources during the past year. The 
information consistently indicates that controlled substances are 
being sold from that location. Officers have conducted 
surveillance at various times during the past six months and have 
arrested people residing in the building and found drug 
paraphernalia and controlled substances including 
tnethsrophetamine* Officers observed a purchase of narcotics from 
the house by Darcy McDonald on 6-30-93. McDonald vas 
subsequently arrested and charged vith a narcotics related 
offense. 
13. It is my experience that persons who deal in small 
bindles of methamphetamine will have, in their possession or at 
their residence, narcotics and other evidence of trafficking 
including but not limited to cash, weapons, baggies, scales, buy-
owe sheets and paraphernalia for the use, storage, Bale or 
preparation of narcotics. Such persons will typically sell vhat 
they have as quickly as they can until they are out of inventory 
at which time they will attempt to "re-up" or purchase a large 
quantity to be divided into smaller bindles for sale. 
14. It is currently just after dark on the same day when 
Anderson vas arrested and provided the information described 
above. Although I have attempted to prepare this documentation 
vith reasonable dispatch, I vill be unable to serve the warrant 
before dark. If a search is delayed Important evidence may be 
lost, destroyed or distributed. 
15. It ie also my experience that when drugs are being used 
and sold in a residence occupied by several adults, all of whom 
have criminal histories and experience vith narcotics that all 
persons 'on the premises will likely have relevant evidence on 
their persons or in their possession. Moreover, small bindles of 
drugs as expected in this matter can be readily hidden on a 
person or destroyed once the intent to search is revealed. 
Wherefore, your affiant requests that a warrant be issued for the 
search, day or night, of the residence described above for the 
presence of John Walker and Melissa Seamster and narcotics and 
other evidence of trafficking including but not limited to cash, 
DISCOVERY SENT TO 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
FEB 2 5 1994-"PD 
M4R ! t f994 _ S C 
1 
weapons, baggies, scales, buy-ove sheets and paraphernalia for 
the use, storage, sale or preparation of narcotics. 
Dated this day of February/1994. 
ubecribed to and svorn before me this 
1994 £jJ?j£? »• 
OiSCOVEKYSENTTC 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
FEB 2 5 1994 - PD 
MAR J J )994-5C-
DISGOVtrtY 6tNT TO 
Kay Bryaon DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
Utah County Attorney 
James R. Taylor #3199 ™ Z 5 1994 -fp 
Deputy County Attorney MAR 1 1 1994-t>C 
100 Eas t Center S u i t e 2100 
Provo , Utah 8460b 
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IN THE FOURTH CIRCUIT COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH COUNTY, AMERICAN FORK DEPARTMENT 
IN THE MATTER OF A « 
NARCOTICS INVESTIGATION t f?' 
rv 
SEARCH WARRANT 
t* • 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO ANY POLICE OFFICER OF THE STATjE.-.-QF 
UTAH: • * • f'c. 
:: I -•• 
It h§e been established by oath or affirmation ma^e or 
submitted this *~<-' day of February, 1994 that there is probable 
cause to believe the following: 
1- The property described below is evidence of illegal 
conduct. 
upon 
2. The property described below is most probably located 
the person or at the premises set forth below. 
1
 MJ3. The person in possession of the property is party to the 
aM'eged illegal conduct. 
eearcl 
4, There is a reasonable basis for officers to conduct a 
s ch after daylight hours. 
gii^ en of 
There is a reason to believe that if prior notice is 
iiV' officers'© intent and authority to search that evidence 
may be lost or destroyed before it can be seized. 
NOW THEREFORE, YOU AHD EACH OF YOU, are hereby directed to 
conduct a search of the following described premises and persons: 
The downstairs apartment and the person of all individuals 
present at 479 South 100 East, Pleasant Grove. The building is a 
white frame building containing two apartments. The basement 
apartment is entered from the rear on the east side. 
You are directed to search for the presence of Rick Close, 
John Walker and Melissa Seamster and narcotics and other evidence 
of trafficking including but not limited to cash, weapons, 
150 
b a g g i e s , s c a l e s , buy-ove s h e e t s and p a r a p h e r n a l i a f o r t h e use , 
s t o r a g e , s a l e or preparat ion of n a r c o t i c s . 
THIS WARRANT WAY BE SERVED: 
qfo Day or night without prior notice of authority or 
Intent to search. 
IF YOU FIND THE DESCRIBED PROPERTY, you are directed to bring the 
property forthwith before me at the above named court or to hold 
the same in your possession pending further order of this court. 
You sre instructed to leave a receipt for the property vith the 
person in whose possession the property is found or at the 
premises where the property was located* After the execution of 
the warrant you shall promptly make a verified return of the 
warrant to me together with a written inventory of any seized 
evidence, identifying the place where the property is being held. 
THIS WARRANT BUST BE SERVED WITHIN TEN (IB) DAYS FRQH THE 
DATE OF ISSUANCE. 
Dated this ^"2-dpv of Feb., 1994 at 0 ' *"^ . m. 
Magistrate 
DISCOVERY ScfoT TO 
DEFENSE ATTORNEY 
FEB 2 5 1994-PP 
MAR 1 1 1994 - SC 
